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In my books Radical Democracy and Political Theology and the co-authored 
book with Clayton Crockett, Religion, Politics and the Earth, I’ve sometimes been 
accused of being a bit too rosy-eyed. My professed faith in the revolutionary 
power of the people—of a democratized public that always demands more 
democracy—has been criticized for failing to give sufficient attention to the 
social antagonisms within the body politic where questions of economic class 
and identity pose persistent challenges. The points are made of democracy’s 
Western—even more, its colonial and imperialistic—pedigree, of democracy’s 
capture by consumer capitalism, and of its logic of exclusionary inclusion built 
on the backs of slave, immigrant and domestic labor.
 Perhaps my tone struck when declaring democracy the political 
instantiation of the death of God came across too celebratory.  What I wish 
to have made clear is that Alexis de Tocqueville’s expressed “terror” at God’s 
apparent self-willed annihilation with the people’s claim to the sovereignty that 
was once the exclusive province of God’s should be regarded as no different 
from Colonel Hurtz’s horror at his own “heart of darkness,” and by extension, 
the nearly orgiastic violence and hatred that lies at the heart of Western man’s 
civilizing project.  Or, there is the more familiar reference from Nietzsche’s 
proclamation that God is dead.  The pathos and foreboding from both 
Tocqueville and Nietzsche are real.  After all, without the working hypothesis of 
God, we are left with the ambivalent conclusion that our fate is in our hands.  It 
is the ultimate theo-political question of sovereignty in that it poses to us the 
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question of “Who will decide the fate of humanity?”
 As I have written elsewhere, when Carl Schmitt addresses this question, 
he provides real, albeit limited, clarity.  The problem, he says, with the 
modern, techonocratic state is that, whether by bureaucratic machinations or 
constitutional proceduralism, no one decides.  
 We might add to this the specter of global capital where the power of 
the transnational corporation so often usurps, coopts, undermines or distorts 
the claims to, and institutions of, the sovereign nation state.  The point here, as 
Wendy Brown has masterfully analyzed in her book Undoing the Demos, is that 
when not only the state, but also society, rationalize themselves in exclusively 
economic terms, as prevails in the current neoliberal order, the condition of 
possibility for politics itself is vanquished.  As Brown puts it, “homo politicus is 
the most important causality in the ascendance of neoliberal reason.”
 Democracy is under threat, but it is not the external or overt threats 
that we should be concerned with; rather, it is the way by which democracy 
is “hollowed out from within”—a complacency or docility wherein neoliberal 
reason slowly but ineluctably becomes the governing rationality in a fashion 
that is “more termitelike than lionlike,”, a biopolitics by which the human subject 
gets reprogrammed, domesticated, even denatured as a political animal, a mode 
of disciplinary power no longer operating by command and control, but in an 
integrated, networked and cooperative fashion. 
 The examples and effects Brown gives to this process of 
transmogrification are real and widespread.  The main examples for her are 
what she calls the “remaking of the soul” and the “remaking of the state.” 
The former is my principal concern here and speaks to the steady erosion of 
the Humanities within higher education.  This erosion has occurred partly as 
a result of defunding, but even more, it is the result of the order of neoliberal 
rationality that demands all value be justified in exclusively economic terms.  
So the “cultivation and expression of distinctly human capacities for ethical 
and political freedom, creativity, unbounded reflection, or invention” become 
unaffordable luxuries reserved only for the privileged few not confined or 
consumed by the necessity for wealth accumulation (or, even more basically, 
the necessity to find gainful employment).  
 We might see this as an attack on intellectual freedom.  And given the 
“globally ubiquitous” form of this neoliberal norm of rationality, we must ask 
what are the conditions of possibility for resistance against this attack?  Once 
again, this brings me back the question that has animated my work in political 
theology all along—namely, “Who decides?”  The mistake that some radical 
democratic theories make is the untenable suggestion that everyone decides.  
Not only does the persistence of various social antagonisms, but also tracing 
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the various social, political and economic trends to their source, reveal such 
a suggestion to be nothing more than a statement of faith or a form of wish 
fulfillment.  The solution offered by Schmitt is that if we are right to diagnose 
the essentially apolitical character of contemporary life then the means to 
restore politics is by way of the state of exception.  If our problem is that no one 
decides, then the remedy is that only one must decide, and that this authority to 
decide is not only the defining characteristic, but also the exclusive prerogative, 
of the sovereign.  
 I have called this Schmittian solution a form of theo-political fatalism.  
And my argument has been that he effectively throws the baby out with 
the bathwater insofar as he refuses the altered conditions, operation, and 
conception of sovereign power in its dispersed and pluralized form.  
 What this means, for my analysis thus far, is that we are left with a series 
of non-starters when it comes to the question of who decides.  What is left after 
“everyone,” “no one,” and “only one” are left wanting? How are we to address 
ourselves to the question if the very alternatives that present themselves are 
exhausted by such naiveté, exploitation, and domination?  Is it possible to 
delink the notion of the sovereign decision from subjective consciousness 
altogether?  Can we consider a scenario in which the alternatives of “everyone,” 
“no one,” and “only one” do not exhaust the full range of possibilities?  Is there 
a philosophy and a mode of action that if not escape then at least contest or 
subvert the logic of the all, none or one?  What, if any, figure of resistance 
remains?  Following Foucault who trains us by the maxim that where there is 
power, there is always resistance, I argue that we must look for a disguised 
figure of resistance, defigured from the forms of political subjectivity that have 
been so thoroughly decimated.
 If the problem in the current neoliberal political order is that no one 
decides, then why not make use of the guerilla tactic of invisibility, incognition, 
or the impersonal.  After all, as has long been noted from W.E.B. DuBois’ notion 
of double-consciousness, while systemic oppression is to be condemned 
and resisted at every level, it also provides certain epistemic advantages—a 
knowledge that goes beyond self-knowledge to the knowledge of others 
fundamental lack of regard.  As Jose Medina has written, this provides the basis 
for a subversive meta-lucidity by its “heightened sensitivity to insensitivity.” In 
this way double-consciousness holds the potentiality for a resistant perception 
and resistant action. “One can also comfortably and strategically occupy one’s 
invisibility,” Medina argues, “exploiting the benefits of being unperceived while 
having access to bodies of evidence one is not assumed to know, of being able 
to use channels of communication that go undetected, of being able to exercise 
forms of reasoning that are not recognized, and so on.”
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I am describing this in terms of a guerilla tactic because it is not meant to 
ameliorate.  It is not trying to resolve conflict or overcome struggle; rather, it 
seeks to provoke and reenergize them.  And insofar as the norms of neoliberal 
rationality has produced a generalized condition of depersonalization and 
powerlessness, this becomes a tactic of resistance that is freely available to any 
or all.
 In short, there is not only freedom, but the power of resistance, hidden in 
the invisibility wrought by “neoliberalism’s stealth revolution.”
